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ABSTRACT 
 
Several studies provide evidence that the effect of most anomalies tend to disappear as 
soon as they are discovered, but that was not the case of Momentum. After two decades 
of research, Momentum still exists on stock markets and with the same strength 
evidenced in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The goal of this paper is to bring a new 
perspective of Momentum spectrum.  
Our finding that many stocks change from “Winner” to “Loser” frequently seems to 
support the hypothesis that firm specific characteristics are not expected to be the key 
determinant of Momentum classification. However, the main result of this study is that 
the understanding of the sources of Momentum anomaly requires taking into account 
two kinds of stocks: those who are frequently “Players" (“Winner” or “Loser”) and 
those that rarely are. Our study provides empirical evidence on a number of factors that 
explain the classification of firms as “Players” or “Non Players” based on 
Discriminant Analysis and Logit Regression. At our knowledge, we are the first to 
provide such kind of evidence.  
 
Keywords: Momentum Classification, Firms’ Characteristics  
JEL Codes: G11, G12, G14 
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1. Introduction 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) seminal paper, Momentum anomaly has been a 
subject of many papers in Financial Literature. More specifically, two different (but 
related) trends appeared: one trying to quantify its profitability and another focused on 
finding its sources. 
The first one basically shows that the Strategy of buying past “Winners” (stocks with 
the best performances over past 6 months) and selling “Losers” (those with the worst 
performance over past 6 months) is profitable in many different markets all over the 
world (see, for example, Rouwenhorst (1998, 1999) for Europe and Emerging Markets 
and Chui, Titman and Wei (2003) for Asian Markets) and for different time periods 
(e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Fama and French (2008, 2012)). 
On the other side, several works provide different explanations to the source of this 
anomaly. Firms’ characteristics like Size, Book-to-Market ratio (see, for example, 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) and Fama and French (2008, 2012)
1
), and Credit Risk (e.g. 
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007)) to risk based explanations (see, for 
example, Fama and French (1996) and Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003)), arbitrage limits 
(e.g. Shleifler and Vishny (1997)) and more possible causes were appointed to it. 
However, there is not a consensus about the source(s) of the anomaly and we think we 
could bring a new perspective of Momentum spectrum. 
We extend Momentum Literature in three ways by showing that: (1) contrarily of we 
could think, it seems that firms specific characteristics are not the key to the 
classification of stocks, (2) there is a positive and significant correlation between the 
number of times that a company is classified as “Winner” and “Loser” and (3) there are 
two kinds of companies: those who are frequently “Players” (stocks classified as 
“Winner” or “Loser”) and those where the likelihood of being classified as one of them 
is very low. At our knowledge, we are the first to provide such kind of evidence.  
According to our results, almost all stocks were classified at least once as “Winner” 
(93.30% using non adjusted returns and 84.60% with abnormal returns
2
) or “Loser” 
(78.89% and 81.97%, respectively) for the sample period from January 2003 to 
                                                 
1
 Their results shows that Momentum profitability is connected to small caps but this fact cannot 
explain its existence  
2
 Resids from Fama and French Three Factor Model Adjustment (Fama and French (1993)) 
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December 2011. This finding, connected to the discovery of concentration of “Players” 
observations in a small group of stocks, seems to suggest that firm specific 
characteristics cannot explain, by themselves, the classification of Momentum Strategy. 
Initially, we thought about ranking firms by the number of times that a stock was 
classified in each kind in order to dissociate Top “Winners” from Top “Losers” (Top 
quintile of each rank). However, that becomes impossible because some stocks were in 
both, so we had no other option than studying Top “Players” (Top quintile of 
“Players” ranking). 
With a selection criterion, we thought it would be possible to separate them in three 
groups: Winners, Losers and The Others. However, we did not find one capable of have 
balanced groups (in this context, balanced means with, approximately, the same number 
of stocks in each one) and, at the same time, make some sense in the dissociation so, our 
results appointed, clearly, to the impossibility of dissociation. Just a few stocks are, 
clearly, “Winners” or “Losers” because the majority of them change often in their 
classification. 
In order to finish this issue, we verified the correlation between the number of times that 
a company is classified as “Winner” and “Loser” and, contrarily to our initial 
expectations (but expected after verify the impossibility of dissociation), this correlation 
is positive (0.4387) and very significant (t = 16.21). This shows, without doubts, that we 
cannot dissociate these two kinds of “Players”. 
However, how can Momentum be so profitable when we are not capable to dissociate 
the two kinds of “Players”? Why firms’ characteristics (such as Size (Fama and French 
(2008, 2012)) and Credit Risk (Avramov, Chordia, Jostova and Philipov (2007)) have 
impact in the profitability of Momentum Strategy?  
The answer to these questions can be the existence of two groups of “Players”. When 
we rank the sample by number of times that a stock is “Player”, the bottom quintile 
represents only 1.84% of total “Players’” observations and the top quintile has 44.54% 
of it. As we can see, the difference to the percentage of stocks in each quintile (i.e. 
around 20%) is very high so, according to our results, we can conclude that there are 
two different groups: The “Players” (PG and top quintile) and The “Non-Players” 
(NPG and bottom quintile). In this way, firms’ characteristics as Size and Credit Risk 
cannot explain Momentum but can be capable to explain the existence of these two 
groups. 
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In order to show if this information is correct, we saw if those characteristics are 
capable to dissociate the two groups in a Discriminant Analysis. The most important 
results of this approach are that Size, Credit Rating and firm’s Profitability are the key 
to dissociate PG from NPG. Spread can be efficient on dissociation because of its 
coefficient but, as the values that it assumes are very low, this is not a key characteristic. 
On the other hand, Book-to-Market, even being statistically significant, does not have 
discriminatory capacity. All firms’ characteristics analyzed have a positive sign except 
for Size. 
To finalize our paper, we present a Logit regression to get the probability of a stock 
being classified as “Player” in the period. The results of this approach are similar (in 
sign and importance) to Discriminant Analysis, with the exception of Spread that has a 
negative coefficient. Nevertheless, this variable has not a significant impact in the 
likelihood of stocks’ classification because, in our opinion, of the information contained 
on Dummy variables
3
. We present also a Sorting analysis to get the marginal effects in 
the likelihood of a stock be a “Player. 
However, Logit Regression cannot predict if a stock will be a “Player” in the next 
period because, to have a likelihood of at least 50%, it is necessary a small cap with 
negative net income. By the other side, Sorting analysis suggests that it is not 
necessarily the stock be a small cap because the coefficient of the Size bottom quintile 
is not statically significant. So, we can easy conclude that other sources not related with 
the characteristics of “Player” may be capable of get better results in this domain. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: Section I brief reviews Momentum 
Literature, Section II presents the data and methodology of this paper. Section III 
contains the results in the following order: first of Discriminant Analyzed followed by a 
Sorting approach and finalize with a Logit Regression. Finally, Section IV concludes. 
                                                 
3
 Spread is a proxy for information assymetry and transaction costs. As transaction costs do not 
have influence in Momentum (see Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) for more information), the impact of this 
variable just can be connected to information. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Since Jegadeesah and Titman (1996) seminal paper, Financial Literature tries to 
discover the sources of Momentum anomaly. However, at this moment, there are not 
many consensuses about this. 
As an anomaly disappears of the markets with the help of arbitrageurs, the risk factor is 
one of the most studied as source of this anomaly because, if there is some kind of risk 
in Momentum Strategy, they will not act and the profitability of this trading strategy can 
be explained by this. However all papers that studied this question concludes the same: 
Risk do not have influence in Momentum. Indeed, Fama and French (1996) shows that 
this anomaly is the only that their Three Factor Model cannot explain. 
In the same line, Shleifler and Vishny (1997) study if arbitrage limits can explain the 
existence of Momentum. This finding is very important to this question for the same 
reason of risk: if there are limits to arbitrage, arbitrageurs will not be capable to act and 
lead to the end of this anomaly. However, they argue that the limits exist but, in the 
limit, are capable to help to explain the persistence of Momentum. As arbitrageurs can 
act, other sources were appointed to this anomaly. 
The impact of information is also a trend very studied in the Literature because of its 
uncertainty. Zhang (2006) is one the most complete works in this domain by showing 
that the profitability of Momentum has a positive correlation with information 
uncertainty and, more specifically, is related to an overreaction to new information 
when its uncertainty is higher. This finding is crucial because prior Literature attributed 
price continuation to a slow market response to information (see, for example, Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)) and he shows exactly the opposite. 
Another important finding is the effect of Size. Several works (including Fama and 
French (2008, 2012)) show that the profitability of Momentum is related to small caps. 
Of all firms characteristics appointed to Momentum “Players” this is the only where 
exist some consensus. 
As for the Credit Risk effect, we think that Avramov (2007) work is very important. He 
argues that stocks with a high grade of credit rating do not exhibit Momentum contrarily 
of the low grade stocks. In fact, he goes further: this specification is independent of Size 
because even small caps with high grade do not exhibit Momentum and big stocks with 
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low grade exhibit it. This finding is crucial because shows that other characteristics not 
related to Size can influence the profitability of this anomaly. 
Another specification usually studied in Momentum Strategy is Book-to-Market (BTM). 
Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), for example, show that this anomaly has a positive relation 
with BTM. It is true that their goal
4
 was not show the relation between them but they 
have, indeed, done it. The information that stocks with low valuation are connected to 
Momentum is important because there are some common characteristics in this 
companies (as, for example, Analyst Coverage). 
To finalize this section, we just want to refer that other works appoint characteristics of 
stocks (as revenues, costs, options (Sagi and Seasholes (2007)) and Analyst Coverage 
(Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), for example), investors (e.g. overconfidence and self-
attribution bias (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)) and even local effects 
(e.g. Legal Systems and Individualism (Chui, Titman, Wei (2000, 2010)) to Momentum. 
The extent roll of possible explanations to this question (and we just present a sample of 
it) tells us the complexity of this anomaly and how difficult is the discovery of its 
source(s). 
                                                 
4
 Their goal was to dissociate BTM effect from Analyst Covarege 
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
Using a sample of 1104 companies
5
, we analyze 6 months Momentum anomaly in 
London Stock Exchange from the sample period of January 2003 to December 2011. 
DataStream Database was the source of all our primary data, except for free risk rated 
return (Bank of England website). 
Our first step was to see if Momentum Strategy continues to produce positive returns. In 
order to do that, we had calculated the logarithmic return
6
 and applied Jegadessh and 
Titman (1993) methodology. To eliminate the existing outliers, we adopted a 
methodology where we substituted abnormal values
7
 by the average of the 3 last and the 
3 following monthly returns. Then, we adjusted returns for all companies by Fama and 
French Three Factor Model (Fama and French (1993)) and tested anomaly again with 
the abnormal returns (residual return from adjustment)
8
. 
After that, we separate Players Group (PG) and Non Players Group (NPG) from the 
others. To do that, we ranked the number of times that each company was “Player” in 
Momentum Strategy. The top quintile represents PG and the bottom the NPG.  
To dissociate firms’ specifications of each group, we have done the Discriminant 
Analysis. The results of this approach will tell us if any characteristic analyzed has 
discriminatory capacity and if they are capable to dissociate clearly the two groups. In 
another view, we present a Sorting Analysis with the goal of catch the marginal effects 
for each variable. We finalize this paper with a Logit Regression. Its goal is trying to get 
a model capable of predict which stocks will be classified as “Players” in the period. 
 
                                                 
5
 Initially, we had 1134 firms but we needed simultaneously information about Capitalization, 
Equity and Total Return Index 
6
We used DataStream’s Total Return Index to calculate the logarithmic return 
7
 In this context, we considered abnormal value those where its module was superior to 140% 
8
 We classified all stocks again in order to eliminate the risk factor from our analysis 
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4. Results 
 
4.1.  Momentum Profitability 
As we can see in Panel A, Momentum still produces returns around 1% per month in 
both approaches (equal-weight (EW) and value-weight (VW))
9
 and its performance is 
significantly related with “Losers” performance that, among 6 months, had returns of     
-10.62% (t = -3.85) and -9.89% (t = -2.94) in EW and VW, respectively. On the other 
hand, “Winners” performance is statically insignificant (t = -0.96 and 0.30 to EW and 
VW, respectively). These results are similar to the existing Literature (see, for example, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) and Rouwenhourst (1998, 1999)). 
However, there is more information that we can get from the analysis of profitability of 
this anomaly. It seems that Momentum only exists from May to September (Panel B)
10
. 
That is very interesting because, out of this period, Momentum Strategy does not 
produce significant returns. A possible reason to this fact can be the adjustments 
produced in the market related to accounting reports as cause of this anomaly. 
But, with a sample period from 2003 to 2011, these conclusions are not very robust 
(each month only has 7 observations in this period). It is needed to analyze this question 
in a larger horizon to have more robust results. 
On the other hand, we cannot forget that accounting reports just produce information to 
investors. With this information, they can evaluate the performance of a company in the 
last year and adjust their predictions of its future. As Zhang (2006) argues, Momentum 
has a positive relation with information uncertainty and, to stocks where it is higher, 
investors overreact to both good and bad news. So, ours findings can, on limit, be 
supported on Zhang’s (2006) because accounting reports can be the only source of 
information to some kind of stocks. 
Another important issue in Momentum is the effect of 2008 financial crisis
11
. According 
to our results in Panel C, the profitability of this strategy was higher before this 
financial crisis. This fact is in coherence with previous Literature (see, for example 
Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004)). 
                                                 
9
 In VW, profitabillity of Momentum is statisckly a little higger than 1% (difference to 1% have 
a t-statistic of 1.73). However, this is not a very robust conclusion.  
10
 In VW approach, June is not statically relevant 
11
 We considered the begginig of the current financial crisis in January of 2008 
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Panel A - Descriptive Statistic of Momentum 
      
Portfolio µ Max Min Med Σ 
Equal-Weight (EW) 
W 
-2.13% 
(-0.96) 
35.14% -76.21% 2.31% 0.2121 
L 
-10.62% 
(-3.85)*** 
77.39% -80.26% -11.46% 0.2695 
(W-L) 
8.49% 
(4.94)*** 
33.23% -62.16% 13.00% 0.1690 
(W-L)/6 
1.42% 
(4.94)*** 
5.54% -10.36% 2.17% 0,0282 
Value-Weight (VW) 
W 
0.60% 
(0.30) 
38.60% -71.93% 3.42% 0.1962 
L 
-9.89% 
(-2.94)*** 
99.53% -121.33% -4.15% 0.3298 
(W-L) 
10.49% 
(4.05)*** 
85.52% -83.13% 10.45% 0.2536 
(W-L)/6 
1.75% 
(4.04)*** 
14.25% -13.86% 1.74% 0.0422 
This panel shows information about 6 Months Momentum in London Stock Exchange for the period of 
January 2003 to December 2011. We present the Return (µ), Maximum (Max), Minimun (Min), Median 
(Med) and Standard Deviation (σ) for Winners (W), Losers (L) and Momentum Strategy ((W-L) for 6 
months period and (W-L)/6 for monthly information) for equal-weight (EW) and value-weight (VW) 
approaches. In brackets we have t-statistics and its significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 
1% of significance, respectively. 
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Panel B - Average Returns by Civil Year Months 
 
Portfolio Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Equal-Weight or EW 
W 
-4.62% 
(-0.74) 
-10.91% 
(-1.55) 
-8.89% 
(-1.09) 
-14.00% 
(1.56) 
 -14.78% 
(-1.23) 
-10.45% 
(-0.97) 
0.77% 
(0.06) 
0.08% 
(0.00) 
0.84% 
(0.09) 
7.16% 
(1.34) 
5.30% 
(1.32) 
2.51% 
(0.80) 
L 
-6.36% 
(-0.66) 
-7.35% 
(-0.51) 
-8.32% 
(-0.59) 
-18.70% 
(-1.64) 
-24.22% 
(-2.16)* 
-27.20% 
(-2.52)* 
-12.82% 
(-1.12) 
-13.68% 
(1.22) 
-14.76% 
(-1.90) 
-4.75% 
(-0.60) 
-3.51% 
(-0.43) 
-1.16 
(-0.09) 
(W-L) 
1.74% 
(0.25) 
-3.55% 
(-0.34) 
-0.67% 
(-0.09) 
4.71% 
(0.83) 
9.44% 
(2.21)* 
16.76% 
(4.08)*** 
13.59% 
(4.00)*** 
13.75% 
(3.29)*** 
15.60% 
(4.94)*** 
11.90% 
(1.70) 
8.81% 
(1.11) 
3.66% 
(0.35) 
(W-L)/6 
0.29% 
(0.25) 
-0.59% 
(-0.34) 
-0.11% 
(-0.09) 
0.78% 
(0.83) 
1.57% 
(2.21)* 
2.79% 
(4.08)*** 
2.27% 
(4.00)*** 
2.29% 
(3,29)*** 
2.60% 
(4.94)*** 
1.98% 
(1.70) 
1.47% 
(1.11) 
0.61% 
(0.35) 
Value-Weight or VW 
W 
- 0.08% 
(- 0.08) 
-0.53% 
(-0.09) 
-5.75% 
(-0.68) 
-10.75% 
(-0.96) 
-6.66% 
(-0.59) 
1.08% 
(0.12) 
2.63% 
(0.35) 
6.58% 
(0.79) 
7.03% 
(1.02) 
8.64% 
(1.45) 
6.27% 
(1.23) 
-1.27% 
(-0.51) 
L 
3.73% 
(0.27) 
3.03% 
(0.20) 
-13.01% 
(-0.98) 
-19.01% 
(-2.28)* 
-21.27% 
(1.55) 
-8.76% 
(-0.73) 
-15.24% 
(-1.16) 
-20.17% 
(-1.16) 
-14.10% 
(-1.82) 
-0.80% 
(-0.11) 
-3.01% 
(-0.55) 
-10.10% 
(-1.03) 
(W-L) 
 - 3.81% 
(- 0.32) 
-3.56% 
(-0.26) 
7.26% 
(0.77) 
8.26% 
(1.60) 
14.61% 
(3.11)** 
9.84% 
(1.44) 
17.87% 
(2.18)* 
26.75% 
(2.04)* 
21.14% 
(4.48)*** 
9.44% 
(1.28) 
9.28% 
(1.44) 
8.83% 
(0.84) 
(W-L)/6 
- 0.63% 
(-0.32) 
-0.59% 
(-0.28) 
1.21% 
(0.77) 
1.38% 
(1.60) 
2.43% 
(3.11)** 
1.64% 
(1.44) 
2.98% 
(2.18)* 
4.46% 
(2.04)* 
3.52% 
(4.48)*** 
1.57% 
(1.28) 
1.55% 
(1.44) 
1.47% 
(0.84) 
This panel shows the returns of 6 Months Momentum for each Civil Year Months for both approaches (EW and VW). W, L (W-L) and (W-L)/6 represent the same that Panel A and, in 
columns, we have the months from January (Jan) to December (Dec) by order.  In brackets we have t-statistics and its significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of 
significance, respectively. 
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Panel C - Crisis Effect and Momentum 
 
Portfolio 
Before December 
2007 (1) 
After January 
2008 (2) 
Difference 
(2) - (1) 
Equal-Weight or EW 
W 
2.92% 
(1.52) 
-8.62% 
(-2.06)** 
-11.55% 
(-2.51)** 
L 
-11.62% 
(-6.48)*** 
-9.34% 
(-1.58) 
2.28% 
(0.38) 
(W-L) 
14.54% 
(11.63)*** 
0.72% 
(0.24) 
-13.82% 
(3.95)*** 
(W-L)/6 
2.42% 
(11.63)*** 
0.12% 
(0.24) 
-2.30% 
(3.95)*** 
Value-Weight or VW 
W 
19.51% 
(3.79)**** 
-1.92% 
(1.69)* 
-21.43% 
(-3.02)*** 
L 
3.25% 
(2.95)*** 
-0.32% 
(-1.80) 
-3.57% 
(-0.61) 
(W-L) 
16.25% 
(5.32)*** 
-1.60% 
(1.24) 
-17.86% 
(-1.48) 
(W-L)/6 
2.71% 
(5.32)*** 
-0.27% 
(-1.24) 
-2.98% 
(-1.48) 
In this panel we can see the effect of 2008 financial crisis in the profitability of each Momentum 
portfolio (with the same representation than in the others Panels) in both approaches (EW and VW). In 
brackets we have t-statistics and its significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of 
significance, respectively. 
 
  
 11 
 
  
Looking more profoundly to this question, we can see that it is related to the 
performance of “Winners” that decreased 11.55% (1.93% per month and t = -2.51). On 
the other hand, the performance of “Losers” seems to be more stable even in recession 
periods because it only increased 2.28% (0.38% per month and t = 0.38). A possible 
explanation to this can be a change in specifications of “Players”. 
To eliminate risk factor, we have adjusted monthly returns for each company following 
Fama and French Three Factor Model (Fama and French 1993) and results show that 
risk may explain Momentum anomaly (Panel D). 
However, this result is not in coherence with previous Literature (see, for example, 
Fama and French (1996) and Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003)). The reason to this fact is 
the actual financial crisis because, as we can see in Panel F, this strategy was profitable 
at the beginning of the year 2008 in EW (1.43% and t = 7.81) and VW (1.70% and t = 
4.37). So, we could conclude that Momentum profitability can be related to firms’ 
characteristics (because their changes in recession periods) but it has also a relation with 
macroeconomics effects. Nevertheless, we believe that if we analyze a larger period, the 
impact of this recession will be lower and, consequently, Momentum Strategy will have 
positive returns after Fama and French Adjustment, excluding, this way, risk as a 
possible cause. However, we must remember that Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003) argue 
that we can exclude macroeconomics effects from Momentum explanations.  
To finalize Momentum profitability analysis, we want to pay a little attention to Panel E. 
As we can see, this trading strategy, even after Fama and French Three Factor Model 
Adjustment, just produces statically significant returns after accounting reports. 
However, this fact is not as clear as before adjustment but still exists. This brings some 
robustness to hypotheses of “Players” being stocks where these reports are the almost 
the only source of information that common investors can get. On other hand, we 
cannot forget that these results are not very robust because of the low number of 
observations. 
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Panel D - Descriptive Statistic after Fama and French Adjustment 
      
Portfolio µ Max Min Med Σ 
Equal-Weight (EW) 
W 
-4.23% 
(-2.92)*** 
20.30% -57.76% -2.56% 0.1420 
L 
-6.08% 
(-3.76)*** 
62.34% -23.86% -10.25% 0.1585 
(W-L) 
1.85% 
(1.10) 
25.87% -57.07% 6.82% 0.1651 
(W-L)/6 
0.31% 
(1.10) 
4.31% -9.51% 1.14% 0.0276 
Value-Weight (VW) 
W 
-5.19% 
(2.44)** 
31.87% -103.82% -2.19% 0.2083 
L 
-8.66% 
(-3.98)*** 
70.74% -45.02% -9.31% 0.2132 
(W-L) 
3.47% 
(1.40) 
46.79% -76.65% 4.85% 0.2426 
(W-L)/6 
0.58% 
(1.40) 
7.80% -12.78% 0.81% 0.0404 
Similar to Panel A, we present some descriptive statistics about Momentum portfolios. The difference to 
Panel A is that this one shows the results after Fama and French a Adjustment (Fama and French 
(1993)). In brackets we have t-statistics and its significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% 
of significance, respectively. 
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Panel E - After Adjustment Average Returns by Civil Year Months 
 
Portfolio Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Equal-Weight or EW 
W 
-8.57% 
(-1.86) 
-11.13% 
(-1.93)* 
-10.27% 
(2.16)* 
-14.26% 
(2.65)** 
-12.08% 
(-1.65) 
-11.05% 
(-1.36) 
-1.77% 
(-0.26) 
-1.37% 
(0.36) 
-1.12% 
(-0.33) 
-0.28% 
(-0.09) 
0.86% 
(0.30) 
-1.36% 
(0.52) 
L 
-3.86% 
(-0.50) 
-7.26% 
(-0.94) 
-5.73% 
(-0.87) 
-9.24% 
(-1.77) 
-12.20% 
(-2.94)** 
-15.14% 
(-4.19)*** 
-6.69% 
(-1.85) 
-8.16% 
(-2.66)** 
-9.45% 
(-2.53)* 
-1.78% 
(-0.22) 
-1.81% 
(-0.21) 
1.07% 
(0.10) 
(W-L) 
-4.71% 
(-0.73) 
-3.87% 
(-0.71) 
-4.54% 
(-0.84) 
-5.02% 
 (-0.82) 
0.12% 
(0.02) 
4.09% 
(4.08)*** 
4.91% 
(1.09) 
6.79% 
(3.88)*** 
8.34% 
(1.88)* 
1.50% 
(0.16) 
2.67% 
(0.32) 
-2.43% 
(-0.26) 
(W-L)/6 
-0.78% 
(-0.73) 
-0.64% 
(-0.71) 
-0.76% 
(-0.84) 
-0.84% 
(-0.82) 
0.02% 
(0.02) 
0.68% 
(4.08)*** 
0.82% 
(1.09) 
1.13% 
(3.88)*** 
1.39% 
(1.88)* 
0.25% 
(0.16) 
0.44% 
(0.32) 
-0.40% 
(-0.26) 
Value-Weight or VW 
W 
-2.52% 
(-0.57) 
-6.01% 
(-1.79) 
-10.24% 
(-1.59) 
-10.73% 
(-1.46) 
-13.57% 
(-0.92) 
-12.65% 
(-0.97) 
-10.08% 
(-0.86) 
-1.57% 
(-0.38) 
2.86% 
(0.53) 
7.43% 
(1.18) 
1.80% 
(0.44) 
-7.04% 
(-2.66)** 
L 
-10.55% 
(-1.08) 
-5.40% 
(-0.47) 
-5.66% 
(-0.61) 
-15.50% 
(-2.56)** 
-10.47% 
(-1.75) 
-4.70% 
(-0.66) 
-8.10% 
(-1.98)* 
-12.84% 
(-1.88)* 
-13.77% 
(-2.82)** 
-6.39% 
(-1.09) 
0.92% 
(0.11) 
-11.49% 
(-1.11) 
(W-L) 
8.03% 
(0.78) 
-0.61% 
(-0.06) 
-4.58% 
(-0.73) 
4.77% 
(0.81) 
-3.10% 
(-0.33) 
-7.95% 
(-0.72) 
-1.98% 
(0.23) 
11.27% 
(2.61)** 
16.64% 
(2.83)** 
13.82% 
(1.68) 
0.88% 
(0.09) 
4.45% 
(0.39) 
(W-L)/6 
1.34% 
(0.78) 
-0.10% 
(-0.06) 
-0.76% 
(-0.73) 
0.80% 
(0.81) 
-0.52% 
(-0.33) 
-1.32% 
(-0.72) 
-0.33% 
(-0.23) 
1.88% 
(2.61)** 
2.77% 
(2.83) 
2.30% 
(1.68) 
0.15% 
(0.09) 
0.74% 
(0.39) 
Similar to Panel B, this panel shows the returns of 6 Months Momentum for each Civil Year Months for both approaches (EW and VW). The difference to the other Panel is that in this 
one, we considered the abnormal returns of Fama and French (1993) Adjustment. In brackets we have t-statistics and its significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of 
significance, respectively. 
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Panel F - Crisis  Effect after Fama and French Adjustment 
 
Portfolio 
Before December 
2007 (1) 
After January 
2008 (2) 
Difference 
(2) - (1) 
Equal-Weight or EW 
W 
-2.67% 
(-2.20)** 
-6.24% 
(-2.14)** 
-3.57% 
(-1.13) 
L 
-11.26% 
(-11.91)*** 
0.57% 
(0.18) 
11.82% 
(3.51)*** 
(W-L) 
8.59% 
(7.81)*** 
-6.81% 
(2.18)** 
-15.39% 
(-4.64)*** 
(W-L)/6 
1.43% 
(7.81%) 
-1.13% 
(2.18)** 
-2.57% 
(-4.64)*** 
Value-Weight or VW 
W 
-1.94% 
(-1.18) 
-9.38% 
(-2.17)** 
-7.44% 
(-1.61) 
L 
-12.12% 
(-6.50)*** 
-4.22% 
(-0.98) 
7.90% 
(1.69)* 
(W-L) 
10.18% 
(4.37)*** 
-5.16% 
(-1.15) 
-15.34% 
(-3.03)*** 
(W-L)/6 
1.70% 
(4.37)*** 
-0.86% 
(-1.15) 
-2.56% 
(-3.03)*** 
Similar to Panel C, this panel shows the returns of 6 Months Momentum before and after 2008 finacial 
crisis for both approaches (EW and VW). The difference to the other Panel is that in this one, we 
considered the abnormal returns of Fama and French (1993) Adjustment. In brackets we have t-statistics 
and its significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of significance, respectively. 
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4.2. Momentum Groups: PG and NPG  
However, our results seem to suggest that firms’ specific characteristics do not have 
influence in the classification of Momentum “Players”. When we analyze the 
percentage of stocks that were classified as “Winners” or “Losers” along the sample 
period, we will see that this percentage is very high in both kinds of “Players” in all 
approaches (see panel G). This finding connected with information of Panel I 
(concentration of “Players” observations in a small group of stocks) suggests that 
firms’ specific characteristics do not have a lot of influence in the classification of 
stocks. 
As the stocks used in this anomaly are not the same with and without Fama and French 
Three Factor Model Adjustment, it is important to prove that they do not differ a lot 
from each other and we can find this information on Panel H. Only 7.8% of total 
observations changed their classification and around 20% of “Players” were 
“declassified”. This way, we can affirm that they not differ significantly from each other 
so, by now on, we will just analyze after adjustment results. 
With this information, we thought that we could be capable to dissociate Top 
“Winners” and Top “Losers” from the others but, to our surprise, several stocks were 
in both. So, we decided to separate Top “Players” in three groups (Winner, Loser and 
Others Groups) with a selection criterion. However, we could not find one capable of 
get balanced groups (in this context, balanced means with, approximately, the same 
number of stocks in each one) and, at the same time, capable of make some sense. The 
reason to this fact is that the number of time that each stock is classified in one kind of 
“Players” is close to the number of times classified in the other. 
To confirm this, we calculated the correlation between a numbers of times that a stock 
was considered “Winner” and “Loser”. As we were expecting now, the correlation is 
positive (0.4387) and very significant (t = 16.21) confirming symmetry hypotheses
12
. At 
our knowledge, we are the first to provide this kind of evidence. In order to have more 
robustness, we present also, in Panel I, a “correlation analysis”. Basically, we try to get 
the spectrum of the correlation in each quintile and we join Size to have a foreign 
characteristic
13
 in this analysis.  
                                                 
12
 As the number of times that a stock was considered in a kind increases, the number of times 
that it was in the other increases either. 
13
 In this context, foreign means not related with “Players” classification 
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Panel G - Stocks in Momentum Classification 
 
Group Ηi ηt ηi/ηt 
Before Fama and French Adjustment 
Equal-Weight or EW 
W 1030 1104 93.21% 
L 871 1104 78.82% 
P 1058 1104 95.75% 
Value-Weight or VW 
W 1019 1104 92.30% 
L 862 1104 78.08% 
P 1053 1104 95.38% 
After Fama and French Adjustment 
Equal-Weight or EW 
W 934 1104 84.60% 
L 905 1104 81.97% 
P 1009 1104 91.39% 
Value-Weight or VW 
W 924 1104 83.70% 
L 892 1104 80.80% 
P 1004 1104 90.94% 
This panel shows information about the number and percentage of stocks that had been a part of 
Momentum Classification before and after Fama and French Adjustmente (Fama and French (1993). ηi 
and ηt represents the number of different stocks classified in each group and the total of stocks, 
respectivelly. W, L and P represents “Winners”, “Losers” and “Players” 
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Panel H - Adjustment changes on “Winners” and “Losers” 
 
Portfolio Changes Total Percentage 
Total or T 
W 4413 103835 4.25% 
L 3686 103835 3.55% 
Partial or P 
W 2230 9453 23.59% 
L 1842 9411 19.57% 
This panel shows the number (and its percentage) of companies that changed their classificafion because 
of Fama and French Adjustment (Fama and French (1993)). In this context, Total (or T) means the total 
changes in classification of all stocks and Partial (or P) means the changes in original “Players”. W and 
L means “Winners” and “Losers”, respectivelly 
 
 
Panel I: Correlation Analysis 
      
Q η %%η %%P %%(P-η) Correl (W,L) 
Winners Sort 
1 239 21.65% 3.56% -18.09% 
0.1305 
(2.03)** 
2 239 21.65% 12.51% -9.13% 
0.2743 
(4.39)*** 
3 193 17.48% 16.84% -0.65% 
0.0750 
(1.04) 
4 226 20.47% 29.82% 9.35% 
0.0983 
(1.48) 
5 207 18.75% 37.28 18.53% 
-0.0209 
(-0.30) 
Total 1104 100% 100% 0% 
0.4387 
(16.21)*** 
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Q η %%η %%P %%(P-η) Correl (W,L) 
Losers Sort 
1 262 23.73% 4.70% -19.04% 
0.1931 
(3.17)*** 
2 223 20.20% 12.11% -8.09% 
0.1871 
(2.83)*** 
3 201 18.21% 17.77% -0.43% 
0.0801 
(1.13) 
4 198 17.93% 24.86% 6.93% 
0.0465 
(0.65) 
5 220 19.93% 40.56% 20.63% 
0.0204 
(0.30) 
Total 1104 100% 100% 0% 
0.4387 
(16.21)*** 
Players Sort 
1 246 22.28% 1.98% -20.30% 
-0.1657 
(-2.62)*** 
2 211 19.11% 8.93% -10.18% 
-0.7444 
(-16.12)*** 
3 218 19.75% 18.09% -1.66% 
-0.8132 
(-20.54)*** 
4 214 19.38% 27.77% 8.39% 
-0.8721 
(-25.94)*** 
5 215 19.47% 43.23% 23.75% 
-0.6013 
(-10.98)*** 
Total 1104 100% 100% 0% 
0.4387 
(16.21)*** 
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Q η %%η %%P %%(P-η) Correl (W,L) 
Size Sort 
Small Caps 221 20.02% 29.49% 9.47% 
0.2538 
(3.88)*** 
2 221 20.02% 25.62% 5.60% 
0.3273 
(5.13)*** 
3 220 19.92% 21.29% 1.37% 
0.4249 
(6.93)*** 
4 221 20.02% 16.23% -3.79% 
0.3512 
(5.55)*** 
Big Stocks 221 20.02% 7.36% -12.66% 
0.4019 
(6.49)*** 
Total 1104 100% 100% 0% 
0.4387 
(16.21)*** 
This panel shows information about the correlation between the number of times that a stock is classified 
as “Winner” and “Loser” in four sorts (Winner, Loser, Player and Size). In the first collumn we have 
the quintiles (Q). In the following collumns we have, respectivelly, information about the number of 
stocks (η), its percentage (%%η), the percentage of total observations of  “Players” observations 
(%%P), the difference between the last two collumns (%%(P-η)) and the correlation factor of the number 
times that a stock is classified in each kind of “Players” (Correl(W,L)) for each quintile. In brackets we 
have t-statistics and its significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of significance, 
respectively. 
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As expected, there is a negative correlation when we sort in “Players”. In fact, no other 
result was expected because this category is the sum of times that a stock is classified as 
“Winner” and “Loser” so, if we sort it by “Players”, the only possible result is a 
negative correlation between the number of times that it was “Winner” and “Loser”. 
However, when we sort in one of the kinds of “Players”, the conclusion is not the 
same. As Panel I shows, the correlation is always positive
14
 but just in the lower 
quintiles is significant. On the other hand, in both sorting, there is a positive effect of 
increasing the classifications as “Winner”/“Loser” in the other kind exposing, this way, 
the relation between them. This fact is totally confirmed by the sorting on Size. As we 
can see in same Panel, the correlations between them are positive and very significant in 
all quintiles of this characteristic. So we can conclude without doubts that exists a 
positive relation between these two phenomena. Another inference, as we explained 
above, is that firms’ specific characteristics do not seem to be the key of the 
classification of Momentum “Players”. 
But, if that is true, why do characteristics as Size and Credit Rating have some impact in 
Momentum Strategy? The answer can be on the existence of two groups of stocks: The 
Player (or PG) and The Non Players (or NPG). The first one is composed by stocks that 
are frequently classified as “Players” and the other by stocks were the likelihood of 
being classified as “Player” is very low. 
We can get this information from Panel I, more specifically from “Players” Sorting. 
The bottom quintile only represents 1.98% of total “Players” observations but the top 
quintile represents 43.23%. As the difference to the percentage of stocks is very high in 
booth quintiles, we can easily conclude that there exist two groups: PG and NPG. At our 
knowledge, we are the first to provide such kind of evidence. 
This discovery could be crucial to understand Momentum spectrum. In the limit, we 
were looking to the wrong perspective of it and, perhaps, now, with this new 
information, we may find the reason to the existence of this anomaly. However, before 
that, future studies need to confirm these findings around the world and along the time 
in order to eliminate the remote possibility of this fact be specific of London Stock 
Exchange or of the our sample period. 
                                                 
14
 The only exception is the top quintile when sorted by number of times classified “Winner” but 
is not statiscally significant 
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4.3. Discriminant Analysis 
Assuming that there are, in fact, PG and NPG in all markets around the world (that is a 
strong possibility), the first step of this new trend is try to get the firms specific 
characteristics of each one of them. 
As we made correlation analysis with the “Players” after Fama and French Adjustment, 
it is quite reasonable to exclude risk from the role of specifications of them so we try to 
dissociate the two groups with other characteristics appointed by Literature (Size, Book-
to-Market, Spread
15
, Credit Risk and Profitability) with a Discriminant Analysis. As we 
can see in Panel J, all firms’ characteristics analyzed have significant differences 
between PG and NPG but Book-to-Market do not have capacity to dissociate them
16
 (all 
others have discriminatory capacity). 
The use of Dummy variables is related with Zhang (2006) work. As he argues that 
invertors overreact to news when information uncertainty is high, we assume that Credit 
Rating and Profitability are information provided by accounting reports. As Financial 
Literatures shows, when this uncertainty is high, it is quite normal public information 
(specifically, accounting reports) be the only source of it. 
We also hypothesize that information is the key to a stock of PG be classified as 
“Winner” or “Loser”. In our opinion, PG is composed by stocks where the information 
is very uncertain and they vary their classification in accordance of how investors look 
to a new. If they consider it bad then stock will be a “Loser” in the following periods. 
In other way, a good new will lead the stock to a “Winner” classification. 
Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis because we do not have access to 
resources capable of get the information that arrived to the Markets. And even if we 
were capable to see that, we were incapable of knowing how investors looked to them 
because it depends of their expectations. So, to include a proxy of information in our 
analysis, we decided to use these Dummy variables. However, it is crucial confirm our 
results with other methodology because, if this is true, we could be close to dismantle 
the mystery of Momentum classification.  
 
                                                 
15
 Proxy of Liquidity Risk and Information Asymmetry 
16
 Its coefficient is close to zero 
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Panel J: Discriminant Analysis 
 
Test of Equality of Groups Means 
Variable Wilks’ Lambda F-Statistic Significance 
Canonical 
Coeficients 
Size 0.545 33275.47 0.000*** -0.335 
BTM 0.999 24.94 0.000*** 0.000 
Spd 0.768 12058.12 0.000*** 1.782 
NegNI 0.618 24651.85 0.000*** 1.673 
LG 0.956 1840.56 0.000*** 0.463 
HG 0.990 398.90 0.000*** 0.212 
LP 0.998 74.78 0.000*** 0.348 
HP 0.968 1341.07 0.000*** 0.276 
Constant - - - 3.001 
Classification Results 
Original 
Group 
Right 
Classifications 
Wrong 
Classifications 
%% of Right 
Classifications 
%% of Wrong 
Classifications 
NPG 23690 2878 89.17% 10.83% 
PG 19121 4099 82.35% 17.65% 
The Discriminant Model classifies correctly around 86% of total observations 
In this papel we show the most important results of our Discriminant Analysis. The first table shows the 
results of Tests of Equality of Groups Means and the Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients. The 
second one shows the Classification Results. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of significance, 
respectively. 
  
 23 
 
  
Backing to Panel J, we have some interesting findings in the Discriminant Analysis. As 
expected, Size is the most important characteristic to dissociate the two groups. Even 
without the higher coefficient in module, the values that this characteristic assumes is 
much higher than Dummy variables and Spread (this variable has a limited impact in 
dissociation because the values that this variable assumes are very low to its coefficient) 
so it is impossible to they be more important than Size. That was expected because Size 
is the only where is consensus in Momentum Literature. 
But, Size cannot dissociate the two groups without the help of Dummy variables. The 
coefficients of these variables are high and positive. This means that information pays a 
roll of importance in the dissociation. PG is a group where information is more relevant 
than in NPG bringing more likelihood to the hypothesis of information as key of 
Momentum classification. It is also interesting the difference of coefficients for “bad 
news” (NegNI, LP and LG) and “good news” (HG and HP). The model not seems to get 
with the same efficiency the “good news” suggesting that this kind of news has other 
sources. However, it is need others methodologies to have more robust results. 
4.4. Sorting Analysis 
After Discriminant Analysis and before presenting a Logit Regression, it is important to 
have a better idea how changes in characteristics affect the Momentum classification. Of 
all methodologies available, we think that Sorting is that where the results will be more 
robust. To do this analysis, we first separated the sample in quintiles for each 
explanatory variable, estimating then a Logit Regression with those dummy variables. 
This approach is very close to Fama and French (2008) so the inference must be done at 
the same way. 
The difference between the coefficients of Size quintiles is always negative (as 
expected) but only the top quintile is statistically significant. This information was 
unexpected because Literature suggests that Momentum profitability is related to small 
caps. According to our result, what matters to have a “Player” stock is it not makes part 
of Big Stocks. 
This is an important finding because it brings some likelihood to the hypothesis of 
information as key of classification. As Financial Literature shows, the uncertainty of 
information is negatively related with Size. As, contrarily to what we could think, a 
stock to be a part of Momentum Strategy just needs to not be a Big Stock, this 
hypothesis gains some empirical strength. 
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Panel K: Sorting Approach 
 
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 NegNI 
Size 
0.357 
(0.75) 
0.011 
(0.02) 
-0.352 
(-0.74) 
-0.709 
(-1.49) 
-1.780 
(-3.74)*** 
 
BTM 
0.801 
(3.94)*** 
0.288 
(1.41) 
0.259 
(1.27) 
0.263 
(1.30) 
0.623 
(3.06)*** 
 
Spd 
-1.414 
(-41.21)*** 
-0.061 
(-2.56)* 
-0.008 
(-0.34) 
-0.022 
(-0.93) 
0.043 
(1.81)* 
 
CR 
0.360 
(0.65) 
-0.117 
(-0.21) 
-0.245 
(-0.45) 
-0.136 
(-0.25) 
0.485 
(0.88) 
 
ROE 
1.261 
(2.12)** 
0.943 
(1.59) 
0.663 
(1.12) 
0.702 
(1.18) 
0.937 
(1.58) 
1.141 
(39.40)*** 
This panel shows information about our Soting Analysis. In the first collumn we have the analyzed 
variables and the number after Q in the others represents the quintile. To do this analysis, we first sort the 
sample for each variable and then made a Logit regression for each sort. All quintiles are laged by 6 
periods (see explanation to the lag in Logit section). In brackets we have z-statistics and its significance. *, 
** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of significance, respectively. 
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By other side, Credit Rating does not seem to be important because none of coefficients 
is significant but the signs of it show that High Grade (HG) and Low Grade (LG) stocks 
have a positive relation with the likelihood of be a “Player” while the other has a 
negative relation. This trend can be understood as a confirmation of the importance of 
information in Momentum. However, we must remember that, in this approach, Credit 
Rating does not seem to have any kind of relation with the probability of a stock be a 
“Player”. 
With profitability we have another story. Both NegNI and lower quintile (Low 
Profitability or LP) have positive and significant coefficients and, even not being 
significant (but very close of that), top quintile (High Profitability or HP) is close to 
factor 1. Once again, if we consider these three Dummies variables as information, our 
results suggest that information has a preponderant influence in Momentum 
Classification. 
The other two variables (Spread and Book-to-Market or BTM) have top and bottom 
quintiles with significant coefficients. On one hand, BTM’s difference is negative but 
very close of zero and the meaning of this is that it will not be much important in final 
Logit regression. This result was expected because we are analyzing after Fama and 
French Adjustment “Players” so it was very likely that this variable did not show 
capacity to explain it.  
By other hand, Spread’s quintile difference is very high. As this variable is a proxy of 
asymmetry information and transaction costs, it was expected that the sign of that 
difference was positive and our results show exactly this kind of relation. However, just 
the bottom quintile has some impact on the classification because the coefficient of top 
quintile does not have a robust significance. We should not forget too that this variable 
has a limited discriminatory capacity in Discriminant Analysis so, if this result is 
confirmed in the Logit Regression, we must conclude that stocks with low relative 
Spread will not be a “Player” but those with high relative Spread are not necessary one 
of them (similarly to Size inference).  
In sum up, this approach shows clearly that Size is crucial but not in the way we 
thought: instead of being almost necessarily a Small Cap to get a “Player”, we just 
need a stock that is not a Big Stock to have a likely “Player” because the only 
significant coefficient of Size sorting is the top quintile with a negative sign. In the 
same line, Dummies that, in our opinion, represents information are significant in top 
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and bottom quintiles. On this way, these results bring some likelihood to the hypothesis 
of information as key of Momentum Classification. 
4.5. Logit Regression 
In this final section, we pretend to get a full spectrum of the impact of analyzed 
variables. The main difference to previous approach is the consideration of the relation 
between all variables and, by this, results of these two approaches may be different. The 
Logit Regression is the following: 
 
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑖 ,𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽2BTM(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑝𝑑(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽4𝐻𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6)
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽6𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑁𝐼(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽7𝐻𝑃(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽8𝐿𝑃(𝑖 ,𝑡−6)
+ 𝛽9𝐻𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) x 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑁𝐼(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽10𝐻𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) x 𝐻𝑃(𝑖 ,𝑡−6)
+ 𝛽10𝐻𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) x 𝐿𝑃(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽12𝐿𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) x 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑁𝐼(𝑖 ,𝑡−6)
+ 𝛽13𝐿𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) x 𝐿𝑃(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝛽14𝐿𝐺(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) x 𝐻𝑃(𝑖 ,𝑡−6) + 𝑢 (𝑖 ,𝑡) 
 
All independent variables are lagged by 6 months because it is very likely that a change 
today will just produce its effects in the future. Of course that the 6 months are 
discussable but it is necessary some time to a stock that had a stable price (in this 
context, we consider stable as a price that do not have a high volatility in recent past) 
becomes a “Player” and, as the strategy analyzes the past 6 months to classify stocks, 
we believe that it is the best choice. It is possible that other lagging period present better 
results than ours, however, it is very unlikely that they differ a lot from each other. 
The results of this approach (Panel L) are close in sign and significance to the results of 
Discriminant Analysis
 
(with the exception of Spread) and, in the same line, Size is the 
most important characteristic to classification. This result was expected because several 
works (as Fama and French (2008, 2012)) show that this strategy only exhibits positive 
returns when used in small caps. However, we cannot forget that our results of Sorting 
approach suggests that Size effect is not related with Small Caps. The importance of this 
characteristic is connected with the fact of that “Players” are not Big Stocks, so this 
Logit Regression does not have prediction capacity because, according to our model, it 
is essential to a stock be a small cap to enter in Momentum Strategy. By this, we must 
look to these results as a possible explanation and not as a predicting model. 
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Panel L: Logit Regression 
 
Variable Coeficient 
C 
0.359112 
(4.97)*** 
Size (t-6) 
-0.231682 
(-39.38)*** 
BTM (t-6) 
0.014669 
(3.63)*** 
Spd (t-6) 
-0.401822 
(-2.31)** 
HG (t-6) 
0.407045 
(9.10)*** 
LG (t-6) 
0.320877 
(6.33)*** 
NegNI (t-6) 
0.951130 
(30.69)*** 
HP (t-6) 
0.339521 
(7.29)*** 
LP (t-6) 
0.271915 
(6.38)*** 
HG (t-6) x NegNI (t-6) 
-0.097107 
(-1.77)* 
HG (t-6) x HP (t-6) 
0.107526 
(1.19) 
HG (t-6) x LP (t-6) 
-0.011064 
(-0.14) 
LG (t-6) x NegNI (t-6) 
-0.044525 
(-0.75) 
LG (t-6) x LP (t-6) 
0.089835 
(1.02) 
LG (t-6) x HP (t-6) 
-0.100113 
(-1.07) 
Observations 85186 LR Statistic 7828.714*** 
McFadden R² 0.095381 Log likelihood -37124.94 
This panel shows the results of the final Logit Regression. In brackets we have z-statistics and its 
significance. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% of significance, respectively. 
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On the other hand, Spread and BTM (because of the values that both, generally assume) 
do not seem to have any influence in Momentum classification but, if this was expected 
to BTM, Spread should have some significance and other sign. This variable, by itself, 
has discriminative (Discriminant Analysis) and explanatory (Sorting Approach) 
capacity. The real question is: why does this variable fail in the other models? In our 
opinion, this may be because of information. As we know, Spread is a proxy for 
transactions costs and information asymmetry and it just could be important by 
information because transaction costs are insignificants to this question (see, for 
example, Korajczyk and Sadka (2004)). 
We understand that Dummies are information to the market and the truth is that they are 
all statistically significant. In our opinion, Spread’s insignificance is related to these 
variables: they get the main effect of lack of information. Confirm this hypothesis; in 
the model without dummies for information, the sign of this variable coefficient are 
positive (see Appendix B)
17
. This result is, in a certain way, empirical support to the 
hypothesis of information as key of Momentum classification. 
However, our model has a low capacity to obtain the Good News effect (in this context, 
we consider good new HG and HP). That is because it is not very easy to know what is 
or is not a good new. See the example of Apple: their accounting report shows an 
historic positive net income in 2012 and theirs stocks had strong negative returns 
because of that. What investors understand as a good new is more complicated to put in 
a regression than a bad new (difficultly, negative net income (NegNI) and low credit 
rating (LG), for example, are not understand as a bad new). 
In further works, it is crucial to have a better methodology to get this kind of 
information and produce a model were it is possible to predict which stocks will be 
“Players” in the period. Another important thing is to have more and better variables 
capable of measuring information because, once again, our results appoint to that as a 
possible explanation of Momentum Classification. 
In this regression, we analyze also the cumulative effects of Information (i.e. the 
coexistence of two sources of information). The interaction between Dummy variables 
will tell us if the coexistence of news has any kind of effect in the likelihood of a stock 
be considered “Player” in the period and if it is positive or negative.  
                                                 
17
 Its coefficient is not statistically significant is this apporach. However, in all other, we can 
conclude that Spread has some impact in Momentum Classification 
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As we can see in Panel L, interactions between Dummies are not very significant to the 
likelihood of being a Momentum “Player” (just the interaction between NegNI and HG 
is significant but this result is not very robust). However, with a short period as ours, 
this can be normal because, to have an interaction, it is need that a stock is, at the same 
time, in top and/or bottom quintiles of two different ranking. If we consider that every 
stock has the same probability of being there, just around 10%
18
 of total observations 
have conditions to have multi-effects and they will be divided in six variables. With 
such a short number of observations it is very unlikely that these variables have 
significance in a Logit Regression. We believe that, with a better way of getting 
information, all these variables will be significant so it is more important to see the sign 
of them than its significance. 
The most important result of these interaction is that there positive cumulative effects 
when both Dummies represents the same kind of news and that a good new combined 
with a bad new has a negative cumulative effect. However, these results were expected 
because it is normal that a good (bad) new combined with another one produce a higher 
effect than when they are isolated and, it is even more acceptable, that a good combined 
with a bad leads to a lower effect because they will eliminate, in a certain way, the 
effect of one of them. Here it would be interesting to know what effect and in what 
conditions that effect remains in the market. 
In sum up, our model has explanatory capacity but cannot predict witch stocks will be 
classified as “Players” because it has difficulties in measuring the effects of good news 
and size effect is exaggerated (Sorting approach shows that this variables is significant 
in the Top quintile and not in the Bottom). Another problem is the low number of 
observations in the interaction variables so it is needed to improve this model to confirm 
our results. Finally, these results appoints to the hypothesis of information as key of 
Momentum Classification. 
                                                 
18
 We have three dummies to Profitability and one of them (NegNI) has around 30% of total 
observations 
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5. Conclusions 
In our opinion, the main goal of this paper is accomplished: we bring a new perspective 
of Momentum spectrum when we show that there are two different groups of Stocks 
(PG and NPG). 
We argue that Size as the main characteristic to distinguish “Players” from the others 
(and, consequently, PG from NPG) but cannot do it by itself because information 
(measured by dummy variables) pays a roll of importance in this domain. We confirm 
also that Book-to-Market is insignificant after Fama and French Adjustment (Fama and 
French (1993)) and Spread effect is limited because it is only important do not have a 
low relative Spread (but not necessarily a big one) to have a higher likelihood of being 
classified in the period. 
Further works may try to eliminate our limitations. If some of them are easily solved (as 
reply this work in other market and in different (and larger) periods of time) others will 
represent a better challenge. Test the hypothesis of information as key of Momentum 
classification will be one of the most challenging of all because it is very difficult to 
measure information. It could be also interesting evaluate the discriminatory capacity of 
other variables as, for example, analyst coverage and others firms characteristics.  
Nevertheless, our work is very important to Momentum Literature because it can lead to 
the answer that everyone tries to get: Why Momentum exists? We cannot forget that, 
even with those limitations, our findings are robust because all approaches lead to the 
same conclusion and, for the first time, we know that there are two different groups in 
the Markets: PG and NPG. 
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6. Variables Description 
Size: Logarithm of Market Capitalization 
 
Size =  ln 𝑀𝐶  
 
where MC means Market Capitalization (in Millions) 
 
BTM: Book-to-Market ratio 
 
𝐵𝑇𝑀 =  
𝐵𝑉
𝑀𝐶
 
 
 where BV means Book-Value and MC Market Capitalization (both in Millions) 
 
Spd: Relative Spread 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑑 =  
Spread
𝑃
 
 
where Spread is half of the difference between the Ask and Bid Price and P is 
stocks Price 
 
HG: High Grade Stocks 
 
𝐻𝐺 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑅 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
0, 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
where CR means Credit Risk. CR is measured by BSM model (Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974)) 
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LG: Low Grade Stocks 
 
𝐿𝐺 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑅 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
0, 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
where CR means Credit Risk. CR is measured by BSM model (Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974)) 
 
NegNI: Stocks with Negative Net Income 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑁𝐼 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝐼 < 0
0, 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
where NI means Net Income 
 
HP: High Profitability 
 
𝐻𝑃 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
0, 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
where ROE means Return on Equity (Net Income/Equity). Stocks with Negative 
Net Income were excluded because they are considered in NegNI variable 
 
LP: High Profitability 
 
𝐿𝑃 =  
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝑄𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
0, 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
  
 
where ROE means Return on Equity (Net Income/Equity). Stocks with Negative 
Net Income were excluded because they are considered in NegNI variable 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Classification Function Coeficients of Discriminant Analysis 
 
Variable NPG PG 
Size 4.424 
0.300 
85.380 
2.841 
1.059 
1.198 
4.149 
0.558 
-30.859 
3.626 
0.301 
89.630 
6.830 
2.165 
1.703 
4.978 
1.216 
-24.075 
BTM 
Spd 
NegNI 
LG 
HG 
LP 
HP 
Constant 
In this appendix we show the coefficients of Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Function. These are the 
functions that lead to the classification results of Panel J 
 
Appendix B: Logit Regression without Dummy Variables 
 
Variable Coeficient 
C 
1.726698 
(26.45)*** 
Size (t-6) 
-0.300408 
(-53.26)*** 
BTM (t-6) 
0.020500 
(4.94)*** 
Spd (t-6) 
0.069270 
(0.40) 
CR (t-6) 
-0.133283 
(-2.55)** 
ROE (t-6) 
-0.000143 
(-0.29) 
Observations 85068 LR Statistic 5527.154*** 
McFadden R² 0.067501 Log likelihood -38177.77 
This panel shows the results of Logit Regression replacing Dummy variables for CR and ROE. As in panel 
L, in brackets we have z-statistics and the corresponding level of significance. 
 
